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1 
 
Poroi:  An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetorical Analysis and 
Invention is a peer-reviewed on-line journal devoted to the rhetoric 
of inquiry.  In its most general sense, the rhetoric of inquiry 
attempts to apply the tools of rhetorical criticism, whose native soil 
is the critique of political speech, to the production, dissemination, 
and reception of what counts as knowledge.  This research program 
runs against modernity’s conventional opposition between truth 
and persuasion.  Rhetoric, conceived largely of as a battery of 
figurative devices, has generally been perceived in modernity as 
productive of the very antithesis of secure knowledge, as a fount of 
“mere opinion” and even intentional deception.  The nod has gone 
to philosophy, and to the logical tools of which it has been the 
custodian, in separating the wheat of knowledge from the chaff of 
opinion.  In grappling with the more complex relationships 
between knowledge and power that have come to general 
awareness in the contemporary, roughly post-modern period, the 
rhetoric of inquiry challenges the hegemony of philosophy as an 
instrument for producing, interpreting, and criticizing claims to 
knowledge.  It does so by attending not only to patterns of 
reasoning but also to more textual and performative dimensions of 
the discursive field in which any inquiry operates and to the 
situated context in which a speaker inserts him or herself, for 
instance, and to the horizon of his or her audience. 
 
 
2 
 
So construed, rhetoric of inquiry is useful in showing how new 
developments, orientations, or paradigms in the production and 
dissemination of knowledge disturb the equilibrium that at any 
given time tends to obtain among various disciplines.  In the “high” 
modernism that was established after the world wars of the 
twentieth century, equilibrium of this sort was supposed to exist 
between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the 
humanities.  Recently this equilibrium has been disturbed by 
developments in the life sciences.  Beginning in the mid-seventies, 
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techniques for manipulating genes have increasingly bestowed on 
human beings abilities to change living systems in ways that 
promise to become comparable in their magnitude to what applied 
physics, chemistry, and biochemistry have achieved in the last few 
centuries.  A new era of biotechnology is upon us. 
 
3 
 
The influence of molecular genetics has also given rise to versions 
of evolutionary theory that tend to make the seemingly self-
replicating and self-aggrandizing molecular gene both the agent 
and beneficiary of the process of natural selection.  According to 
this view, the adaptive properties of an organism, indeed the 
organism as a living whole, serve merely as vehicles for the gene’s 
replicative prowess.  By the turn of the millennium, the term 
“Darwinism” had become closely associated, in both popular and 
expert communities, with this “selfish gene” theory.  It had also 
become closely linked, that is to say, with the “sociobiological” and 
“evolutionary psychology” research programs that are built on this 
genocentric theory.  These programs disturb the received division 
of academic labor by proposing to absorb the human sciences into 
the natural.  The matter is not a purely theoretical one.  The 
prospect of identifying genes that code for this or that particular 
trait, when combined with the likelihood that genes may be taken 
in and out of living systems at will, has raised the spectre of a new, 
aggressive phase in the history of the eugenics movement, which 
has dogged the Darwinian tradition since the days of Francis 
Galton, Charles Darwin’s first cousin and the founder of eugenics. 
 
 
4 
 
Anxieties about these developments form the background for the 
essays presented in this first, special issue of Poroi Celeste 
Condit
.  In 
’s cautionary tale, we hear the voice of a speaker from the 
twenty-fourth century who looks back to the time – our time – 
when humans, acting presumably to fulfill their personal desires, 
first began the irreversible process of genetic manipulation and 
cyborgian suturing that would eventually lead to a palpably “post-
human” world.  Researching the distant past, he or she (or perhaps 
both or neither) turns up lots of late twentieth-century talk about a 
“post-human” body.  What he/she/it mostly finds, however, is 
post-modernist theorizing about the post-humanist condition 
rather than careful attention to the admittedly primitive set of 
techniques that would eventually lead to a truly post-human 
world.  One implication is that perhaps late twentieth-century 
“humanists” should have paid more attention to the first stirrings 
of the nascent biotechnological revolution in their midst. 
 
 5  They might have paid closer attention, for example, to the  
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developments in medical technology on which Richard Doyle 
meditates in “A Coma Speaks:  Dead Zones of Media and the 
Replication of Family Value.”  The quasi-cyborgian ways in which 
hospitalized humans have been connected to machines, and more 
generally to technological systems, has disturbed in sometimes 
macabre ways the very meaning of what it means to die, and has 
rendered ambiguous even such a seemingly straightforward 
question of when someone can be said to be dead. 
 
6 
 
Chuck Dyke’s response to the current situation in the life sciences 
draws upon Bruno Latour’s suggestion in We Have Never Been 
Modern that, at root, the problems we face, or think we face, have 
actually been brought about in significant measure by the 
modernist myth of a separation of the natural sciences from the 
social sciences and of the latter from the humanities.  Attempts to 
meet contemporary challenges by strengthening the hand of 
humanists against dark, satanic science are likely to be ineffective, 
accordingly, because they toil within the same abstract categories 
of what Latour calls “The Modern Constitution” of knowledge.  
Dyke presents evidence that genuinely engaged scientists and 
science teachers, who make no hard and fast distinctions between 
what is natural, what is social, and what is literary, are in a position 
to help – as Rachel Carson helped when she effectively attacked the 
chemical industry in Silent Spring – instead of tilting against 
abstractions of the sort that are clearly visible today in the frettings 
and fantasized prohibitions of contemporary alarmists about 
biotechnological revolution. 
 
 
7 
 
The mid-twentieth century evolutionary scientist Theodosius 
Dobzhansky once remarked that “Nothing in biology makes sense 
except in the light of evolution.”  Assuming that this is true, it is not 
surprising that opponents of genetic biotechnology, as well as those 
who merely advise caution and reflection, have sought to provide 
backing for their views by questioning the fruits of the neo-
Darwinian Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, which has reigned 
supreme for over half a century as the framework within which the 
rest of biology is to be interpreted.  The presumption is that this 
background theory has licensed unrestricted genetic engineering 
or, at the very least, has failed to provide rich enough conceptual 
and empirical resources to buffer the wilder claims made on its 
behalf. 
 
 
8 
 
Two lines of argument or topoi are available to those who think, 
unlike Dyke, that correct theory matters as much as practice, and 
that bad theory has led to the prospect of unconstrained genetic  
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engineering.  On the one hand, one can presume that the selfish 
gene theory of Richard Dawkins, the evolutionary psychology of 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, and the original sociobiological 
proposals of Edward O. Wilson are the logical and empirical 
outcome of modern Darwinism itself.  One can then try to find and 
commend non-Darwinian, even anti-Darwinian, approaches to 
evolutionary theory as a way of repudiating the contemporary shift 
away from ecology toward genetic technology.  On the other hand, 
one might alternatively argue that contemporary genocentric 
versions of Darwinism are not all that continuous with the Modern 
Evolutionary Synthesis, many of whose mid-century progenitors, 
such as Dobzhansky himself, found approval from humanists 
largely because they opposed the eugenic movement, which they 
believed had highjacked the good name of Darwinism. 
 
9 
 
In her contribution to the issue, Cristina Lopez reports on a 
proposal of the first sort.  Guided by her advocacy of the “Gaia 
hypothesis,” the noted biologist Lynn Margulis, who discovered the 
symbiotic nature of the cell, and her son Dorian Sagan, envision 
the evolutionary process as one of ecological cooperation, 
symbiosis, and self-organization rather than as individualist 
competition.  According to them, selfishness and individualism so 
circumscribe the Darwinian tradition that it can offer little 
resistance to the present ascendancy of genetic engineering, even if 
some of its advocates want to.  Margulis and Sagan seek instead to 
provide an evolutionary and taxonomic mythos in which an 
ecological and feminist perspective will provide a guiding 
framework for public policy.  Lopez concurs, but regrets some 
unfortunate Darwinian backsliding that she detects in Margulis 
and Sagan’s approach to human sexuality. 
 
 
10 
 
The other approach is taken by Leah Ceccarelli.  By carefully 
comparing the rhetorics of the anti-eugenicist Dobzhansky and the 
sociobiological E. O. Wilson, she raises the possibility that an 
inviting, humanistic sort of Darwinism might still be available 
within the framework of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis.  
Ceccarelli sees in Wilson’s Consilience the seeds of its own failure 
as a rhetorical performance; Wilson’s combative mode of address 
and figuration, together with his condescending assumption that 
the cognitively weak humanities and social sciences are just 
waiting around to be delivered into the hands of an imperialistic 
sociobiology, are bound to alienate audiences in ways that 
Dobzhansky’s genial address did not.  For Ceccarelli, these 
differences in style reflects differences in content:  In arguing that 
natural selection has bestowed on all humans alike just enough 
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genetic structure to undergird the free and independent life of 
culture, Dobzhansky denies that there is anything inherently 
Darwinian in the idea that the human sciences should collapse into 
the natural.  One might say, of course, that Dobzhansky had an 
easier time of it.  He had the advantage of living and working 
before the advent of molecular genetics and genetic engineering.  
Keeping his inheritance alive in the age of biomechanical 
reproduction, as his student Richard Lewontin seeks to do in such 
works as Biology as Ideology, is hard work, and fraught with the 
possibility of failure. 
 
11 
 
Finally, a third line of argument about the relationship between 
molecular genetics and evolutionary theory seems available.  One 
might accept the genocentric findings of contemporary Darwinism 
as legitimate, insightful extensions of evolutionary theory, but go 
on to deny that the upshot of genocentric Darwinism is that we 
have little or no choice about whether to oppose the current along 
which our genes presumably carry us.  Steve Fuller reports on 
and criticizes just such a proposal – the ethicist Peter Singer’s “left 
Darwinian” proposal that the tendency of our genes to selfishness 
actually explains why the traditional left, with its naive emphasis 
on nurture over nature, has failed so miserably to impede the 
unjust tendencies of capitalism.  The lesson for Singer is that 
genocentric Darwinism should be allowed to instruct what’s left of 
the left that a truly human politics must fight against tendencies of 
human nature that manifest themselves in capitalism.  In other 
words, the left should cease indulging (as it has traditionally done, 
and in the work of Lewontin continues to do) in the dubious 
assumption that strong-sounding “gene talk” is merely an empty 
ideological reflection of capitalism. 
 
 
12 
 
Admittedly Singer’s view is inconsistent with any really strong 
version of genetic determinism, which must claim that our genes 
have us on such a short leash that our attempts to swim against the 
tide in the name of justice must be in vain.  Singer’s view is 
rhetorically accessible, however, because very few genocentric 
Darwinians are as deterministic as their opponents, such as 
Lewontin, make them out to be.  To be sure, Wilson asserts that 
our genes do hold us on a leash.  But he thinks that the leash is 
fairly long.  Nonetheless, even if he is on sound enough ground on 
this point, Fuller argues that Singer, in taking contemporary 
genocentric Darwinism to his breast, has also taken on board too 
much of the calculative, individualistic utilitarianism in which, 
from the start, Darwinism has tended to express itself.  Singer’s 
“left Darwinism,” Fuller claims, preserves too little of the Hegelian 
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stress on the quest for mutual recognition as the driving force of 
history.  Ever since Marx, that Hegelian idea has driven what was 
most progressive about the left.  For Fuller, its relevance persists 
today, when capitalism is creating for the first time a single world-
wide market (in part by enclosing what Jeremy Rifkin calls “the 
genetic commons”), thereby making it difficult for the inhabitants 
of much of the globe to claim their rightful place in the sun. 
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